The choice and timing of foreign market entry under uncertainty. by Pennings, E & Sleuwaegen, Leo
DEPARTEMENTTOEGEPASTE 
ECONOMISCHE WETENSCHAPPEN 
ONDERZOEKSRAPPORT  NR 9826 





Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
Naamsestraat 69,  8-3000  Leuven ONDERZOEKSRAPPORT  NR 9826 





L. SLEUWAEGEN The Choice and Timing of Foreign Market Entry under Uncertainty 
Enrico Pennings 
Catholic University Leuven and Erasmus University Rotterdam 
Leo Sleuwaegen 
Catholic University Leuven and Erasmus University Rotterdam 
Abstract 
This  paper considers the  minimally required payoffs  to  different means  of foreign 
direct  investments  (FDI),  where  the  investment  is  irreversible  and  payoffs  are 
uncertain. It is found that the critical profit level at which it is optimal to create a joint 
venture  (JV)  increases with  (i)  the share of the TNC  in the JV,  (ii)  the uncertainty 
about the payoffs, and (iii) the difference in taxation between the TNC's government 
and the host country's government. Moreover, cooperative JVs will be formed sooner 
than  non-cooperative JVs.  Under non-cooperation,  the  optimal  share  of the  MNE 
increases  with  uncertainty,  and  decreases  with  taxation.  Under  cooperation,  the 
partners intend to  minimize the share.  The results  obtained partially explain recent 
empirical findings on Chinese JVs. 
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Most existing literature on foreign direct investments (FDI) and other entry strategies 
in foreign markets deals with static models for investment in  a certain environment. 
As a result, the timing of entry  and the relation of uncertainty with the choice of entry 
mode  has  been  left  out  of consideration.  The  typical  entry  modes  include  export, 
licensing agreements, joint venture and wholly owned subsidiary. To investing firms 
entering  new  or  unstable  markets  the  choice  of entry  strategy  is  of paramount 
importance,  as  the  different  entry  modes  represent  varying  levels  of  control, 
commitment and risk (Tse, Pan and Au; 1997). 
This  paper  focuses  on  the  choice  and  timing  of entry  under  uncertainty. 
Stfu-ting  from the full  commitmeni case under FDI,  it moves to  more flexible entry 
modes of joint venture formation, licensing and, finally, exporting. The first approach 
to  analyze  the  timing  of FDI under  certainty conditions  is  given  by  Buckley and 
Casson  (1981).  They  model  the  choice  among  licensing,  exporting,  and  foreign 
investment as  one leading from low toward high fixed cost of investment and relate 
the timing of entry mode to the growth of the market. 
The  introduction  of uncertainty  and  the  concept  of option  analysis  to  the 
analysis  of market entry decisions  was  first  established by Dixit (1989)  and Kogut 
(1991).  Dixit  shows  that  uncertainty  affects  the  timing  of  market  eniry.  Kogut 
analyzes a joint venture as an option to acquire or expand. Most recently, Rivoli and 
Salorio (1996) and Chi and McGuire (1996) discuss the strategic perspectives on the 
timing of investment and the choice of market entry respectively. 
When the TNC can undertake the  investment in the foreign  itself, the  usual 
analysis  follows  the  theory  developed  by  McDonald  and  Siegel  (1986)  and 
summarized  by Dixit and Pindyck  (1994).  In  this  case,  the  company  is  vertically 
1 integrated,  and  does  not  need  to  rely  on  a  local  partner.  In  many  circumstances, 
however,  the  company  has  not the  capabilities  or the  legal  right  to  undertake  the 
investment  itself.  Moreover,  it  is  shown  that  it  is  not  always  optimal  to  solitary 
undertake the project. Allowing for a more general approach, the analysis is extended 
by considering a transnational corporation (TNC) that has a monopoly over setting up 
a joint venture (JV)  with  a local partner.  It is  assumed that the TNC  provides  the 
knowledge  and  technology  for  the  business,  while  its  local  partner  builds  the 
production plant and the distribution network.  In order to  establish this investment, 
the local partner has to incur a sunk investment cost. For both partners, the payoffs to 
the  investment are  uncertain.  The paper considers  contractual joint venture  where 
firms are forced to work together, and as a result optimize profits in a non-cooperative 
way,  as  well  as  cooperative joint ventures. The distinction is  important as  it covers 
different  features  of joint  venture  realities  in  the  developing  markets  of Eastern 
Europe and China (Tse, Pan and Au;  1997). In analyzing joint venture formation, the 
effects of taxation and ownership restrictions are explicitly taken into account. 
Our research about cooperative joint venture formation is most closely related 
to the work of Svesjnar and Smith (1984). They derive optimal transfer prices of the 
input of the partners under Nash bargaining. They show that levying a higher tax on 
the TNC's profits than on the local firm's profits result in a zero share of the TNC or 
lead to transfer prices such that the declared profit is zero. Our approach differs in that 
the  profits  follow  a stochastic  process.  Moreover,  we  focus  on  the  timing of joint 
venture  formation.  By  introducing  uncertainty  and  the  option  value  of waiting  to 
invest, the basic result of Svesjnar and Smith that the partners want to minimize the 
amount  of profit  going  to  the  government  of the  host  country  still  holds.  Their 
hypothesis that "most of our results remain essentially the same when uncertainty is 
2 introduced under risk neutrality" is invalid when the cost of investment is irreversible. 
It is  shown that  uncertainty  shifts  wealth  from  the  TNC  to  the  local  partner.  The 
intuition behind this is that the local partner has a tax advantage in comparison with 
the TNC. This advantage increases with uncertainty since the critical value at which 
investment is  optimal  increases  with  uncertainty,  and the tax is  proportional to  the 
profits. 
The paper is  organized as  follows.  Section 2 discusses  the  critical  value  at 
which it is  optimal to invest when the TNC sets  up  a wholly-owned subsidiary.  In 
section  3,  the  trigger value is  discussed for  non-cooperative  JVs  in three  different 
settings:  (i) the local partner acts as  monopolist; (ii) the TNC has a monopoly while 
there is perfect competition among local partners; and (iii) there is bilateral power and 
imperfect  information  about  the  payoffs  and  the  cost  of  the  project.  Section  4 
examines  the  investment  rules  for  JVs  under  cooperation  in  a  Nash-bargaining 
framework.  In  section 5,  the  choice between exporting,  JV and FDI is  considered. 
Finally, section 6 draws some results on the choice and timing of foreign market entry 
strategy under various environmental and regulatory conditions. 
2. Wholly-Owned Subsidiary 
Suppose  that  the  profits  of  undertaking  the  investment,  n,  foliow  a  geometric 
Brownian motion with drift Jl and standard deviation (J. Mathematically expressed, 
dn = J1ndt + andz  (1) 
where z is a Wiener process, Jl denotes the drift and (J denotes the standard deviation. 
The value of the investment project is given by 
3 V(t)=  E[f~  exp(-p(s-t))n(S)dS] = n(t) 
t  P-J.-l 
(2) 
subject to the condition that the appropriate discount rate (p) exceeds the drift rate of 
the pre-tax profits.  Since V is  a constant multiple of n,  V also follows  a geometric 
Brownian motion with a drift of  J..l and a standard deviation of cr, so 
dV =  J.lVdt + aVdz  (3) 
When profits are taxed by the foreign government at rate  O~'tt<l, profits at time t are 
given by (l-'tf)n(t) and the value of the project at time t changes into (l-'tf)V(t). The 
irreversible cost of investment for a wholly-owned subsidiary is denoted by cwo  From 
the  theory  of investment  under  uncertainty,  it  is  well-known  that  giving  up  an 
irreversible cost of investment of Cw  in return for the project value is optimal when V 
exceeds a certain critical value V*. The critical value can be expressed as (e.g. Dixit 




Setting up a wholly-owned subsidiary has the disadvantage of paying the tax levied on 
foreign  firms  and  of lacking  the  k~owledge required  for  optimally  exploiting the 
company's  competitive  advantage  abroad.  Moreover,  the  critical  value  can  be 
substantial when the difference in taxation between the TNC and a local partner is 
considerable. The next sections show that the trigger value of investment is lower for 
JVs, so, when the project value is rather low, a company prefers to start a JV to setting 
up a wholly-owned subsidiary. 
4 3 Non-Cooperative Joint Ventures 
3.1 Non-Cooperative Joint Ventures: Local Monopoly 
It is  assumed that the local partner and the TNC have perfect information about the 
sunk outlays that are required to enter the industry at an efficient level of production, 
and the expected profits that are generated by entry. The profits of the TNC can be 
written as 
~~(1- To )(8(1- T)V *  +rp - X)(:*)fl  (6) 
where  'T  stands  for  the  relative  difference  in  the  tax  rate  levied  by  the  foreign 
government and the  tax  rate  'To  levied by the  government of the  TNC's country of 
origin  1,  <p  is the transfer price from the local partner to the TNC as compensation for 
the TNC's input of knowledge and technology, and 8 is the profit share of the TNC. 
When the TNC maximizes its profits, the trigger value of investment is given by 
8(I-T)V*= /-1 (X -rp).  (7) 
The payoff to the local partner, G, is given by the transfer price X minus the 
sunk cost,  Cj,  required for  undertaking  the  investment,  plus  the  share  in  the  JV's 
profits. 
Since the timing of investment depends on the reaction of the TNC upon the 
transfer price of the local partner, G is given bl 
1 1-T = I-T/ 
I-To 
2 Since To  does not affect the investment decision, but merely renders part of the profits of the TNC 




'I  V(t)~V* 
f (x, t) =  0  v(  t) < V *  (9) 
where r is  the appropriate discount rate, and V*  is the critical value of the payoff to 
the JV at which the TNC will set up the JV, as defined in (7). Setting a high X by the 
local company induces a high return, but this return will be achieved at a later date. A 
lower  X  implies  a lower return,  but obtained at  an  earlier date.  Using a  standard 
indicator function  1A  which  takes  the  value  1  on  the  set A,  and  0  otherwise,  the 
maximization problem can be rewritten as 
where T = min{V(t) =  V *}, and E[exp(-rT)] =  U*)fj; see Harrison (1990). Hence, 
t 
the equation turns into 
Solving for X, we find that 
~  [fjS{l--r)  S(1--r)(fj-1)  ] 
X = Max qJ + fj-S+S-r-fjS-r C  j  ,qJ +  fj  V. 
(12) 
When  the  first  term  in  the  Max[.,.]  operator  is  chosen,  V < V *  (X),  and 
(  ~ \  postponement  is  optimal.  When  the  second  term  is  chosen,  V  ~  V * \  X"  and 
immediate investment is optimal. Under a non-equity JV (i.e.  8=1), the first term in 
(12) reduces to  /-1 cj • This means that the local company wants to  have at least the 
same relative after-tax markup as the TNC. This establishes an  important difference 
with  the  results  obtained  in  the  previous  paragraph.  Even  though  the  investment 
outlays are non-stochastic, the TNC pays at least a markup of only c/CB-1) in addition 
6 to  the local set-up cost.  In  the case of a wholly-owned subsidiary, it would pay no 
markup.  Hence,  the  more  uncertainty  about  the  benefits  of the  project,  the  more 
beneficial it is  to  create a wholly owned foreign company in comparison with a JV. 
The equation also shows that the local partner wants full compensation for the transfer 
price of the technology input. 
The critical value at which it is  optimal to create the JV is  the value of V for 
which  the  local  partner  is  indifferent  between  postponement  and  immediate 
investment. So, V* is the value of V for which the first term in the Max-operator in 
(12) equals the second term. Hence, 
fJ2 
V*=  C  (fJ-1)(fJ-O+Ot"-fJOt")  j' 
(13) 
When  V~V*, the local company will relate its transfer price to V,  and use its market 
power to gain a value in addition to the required markup over the sunk outlays. 
Considering the optimal profit share for the MNE, we can substitute (13) and 
(12) into (6) and maximize with respect to  ()  and  <po  Since the payoff to the MNE is 
independent of <p, the maximization problem can be written as 
(  ) fJ-l 
Max{J)  f3 - 8 + 8r - f38r  8 
o 
(14) 
where (J) is a constant that is independent of ().  The optimal share3 is the positive root 
of a quadratic equation that is  obtained from the first order condition. Vie assume a 
maximum profit share of 1. Thus, the optimal profit share is 
(15) 
3 Nakamura and Yeung (1994) provide a principal-agent model where the optimal share of the TNC is a 
trade-off between the benefit and cost (agency cost and technology spillover) of increased ownership. 
Nakamura and Xie (1998) propose a model where both partners negotiate a contract that specifies the 
shares. The dynamic model in this paper can be extended accordingly to account for agency cost and 
technology spillover. 
7 Figure 1 illustrates the optimal share of the TNC in the JV for different combinations 
of B  and "C. 
-------------------------------------- Insert figure 1 about here ----------------------------------
It is  shown that higher uncertainty -and hence  a lower B- leads  to  a higher optimal 
profit  share  of the  TNC.  Obviously,  higher  uncertainty  thus  results  into  a  lower 
transfer price to the local partner. Taxation has a smaller impact on the optimal profit 
share. The figure illustrates that a higher tax leads to a lower profit share of the TNC. 
The intuition behind this result stems from the basic results in the theory of 
irreversible investments: higher uncertainty yields a higher value of waiting to invest. 
Demanding a higher profit share results in  a higher trigger value of investment, but 
also a higher payoff. Taxes have an opposite effect on the optimal share, since they are 
exogenous. Higher uncertainty leads to  a higher trigger value, and hence to  a higher 
payoff to the government. By setting a lower profit share as  well  as  a lower transfer 
price, the TNC can decrease the payoff to the government. When taxes increase, the 
TNC will be more inclined to decrease V*. 
Let F denote the option value of the TNC. First, suppose X  =  J3!s:~:~~g'l" C j  , i.e. 
there is a value in waiting to set up the JV. Then,  F = E[exp(- rT)](8(1- r)V *  -X), 
and  G = E[ exp(  - rT)]( (1- 8)V *  +  X  - C j  )  •  The  functions  can  be  written  as 
and 
(  ~  ~  ~  )13  (13-1)13  G = V 13 cr J3  {3 - 5 + 5r - {35r  {3-J3  T  J3~l.  Second,  suppose 
8 Then,  an  immediate  creation  of  the  JV  is  optimal,  and  F = (1-;)8 V  and 
G =  V - cj  - (1-t";t"/3)6 V . The difference between V - cj  and  F + G  is received by the 
government, and equals 'l'<5V . 
From real  option theory,  it is  well-known that  f3,  with  f3>1,  decreases  with 
uncertainty. This gives some interesting insights. As uncertainty decreases, the local 
partner receives more of the expected profits. When uncertainty goes to zero, the TNC 
does not require a markup at all,  and will be satisfied with a JV that has a zero net 
present value. The local company will get the full difference between the value of the 
investment and the irreversible cost of setting up the JV. This result is also reflected in 
the  formulas.  Since  f3  goes  to  infinity  as  cr  goes  to  zero,  F =  0,  and 
G =  (1- r8)V - C j  • Moreover, equation (15) tells that the optimal share is zero, when 
uncertainty is zero. This, again, reflects the power that the local company has over the 
decision: Though the TNC makes the investment decision, the local partner can gain 
all excess profits. 
Depending on the restrictions  on  the  contractual agreement,  there may exist 
two suboptimal situations; (i) The government imposes that the TNC must at least pay 
the cost of the input of the local company, or the local company cannot finance the 
cost  (in  particular  in  developing  countries),  i.e.  X:::Cj;  and  (ii)  The  government 
imposes a maximum share of the MNE in the profits of the Jv. 
Case 1. The restriction on 8 is that X;::::Cj,  or f38(1- r) ;::::  f3 - 8 +  8r - f38r , so 
(16) 
which  induces  a  nummum  share  for  entry,  required  by  the  TNC.  Under  infinite 
uncertainty and no  taxes, the minimum share is one half.  Under certainty, the TNC 
9 demands the full share and pays the TNC the cost of investment. The minimum share 
is decreasing with uncertainty and increasing with the tax rate. Since the optimal share 
is increasing with uncertainty and decreasing with the tax rate, the deviation from the 
optimal share can be substantial when uncertainty about future profits is low. In this 
case, the optimal share for the MNE is low, while its minimum share is high. 
Substituting the minimum share into (13) gives 
V* =  1-'1"+/3  C 
(/3-1)(1-'1")  j 
(17) 
So the threshold decreases in comparison with the critical value derived for a joint 
venture without a contractual share. When  C j  =  Cw  '  the threshold in (17) exceeds the 
one of (4). A JV will only be preferred when cj  < 1-~+/3 cw ' 
Case 2.  When the government imposes a maximum share by the MNE in the 
JV profits, the results are opposite to the previous findings. A maximum share leads to 
inefficiency when the MNE requires a high profit share. This occurs when uncertainty 
is relatively high and taxes are relatively low. 
3.2 Non-Cooperative Joint  Ventures:  Monopoly for  TNC, Competition among 
Local Partners 
The local monopoly is not attractive for the TNC, especially when the expected profits 
of the JV are  substantial. This paragraph takes  a  look at  another extreme:  there is 
perfect  competition  among  the  local  partners.  Under  perfect  information,  perfect 
competition  drives  the  compensation  for  the  investment  outlays  down  to  its  cost. 
Hence, by substituting  X - qJ  - C j  + (1-8)V* =  0  in equation (7), the trigger value of 
setting up the JV is given by 
10 V*- 13  - 13-8+&-1387: C j  •  (18) 
Comparing the critical values in (13) and (18), we find that the critical value under a 
local  monopoly  is  BI(B-I)  times  higher  than  the  critical  value  when  there  is 
competition among the local  partners.  Since the  sunk outlays for setting up  a joint 
venture will in general be less than the cost for setting up a wholly-owned subsidiary, 
the trigger value in (18) is less than the trigger value in (4). 
3.3 Non-Cooperative Joint Ventures: V and Cj as Strategic Variables 
In the previous extreme cases, there is complete and common knowledge about V and 
c}  Since the  local  company knows  V,  a local  partner acting  as  a  monopolist can 
charge the excess profits of the IV. In  the  other case, where the TNC knows  Cj, the 
TNC profits from perfect competition among local partners. This paragraph extends 
the model by making V and Cj  strategic decision variables of the TNC and the local 
partner, respectively.  In  general, the TNC does  not know about the true cost of the 
local partner in  setting up  the IV, and the local partner does not know the expected 
profits of the JV. 
The IV will be set up  as  soon  as  V"?:.V*  where V*  consists  of the  minimal 
required monopolist profit of the  local  company  and the  minimal  required pre-tax 
monopoly profit of the TNC, i.e. V* is the value as expressed in equation (13), with 8 
defined in (15). The difference with the previous cases lies in the distribution of the 
excess profits, i.e. V  -V*. While the sequential monopoly renders all excess profits to 
the local partner, and the perfect competition among local partners renders all excess 
profits to the TNC, with imperfect information, the excess profits are shared between 
the local partner and the TNC. For ease of exposition, suppose there are no taxes, and 
11 there is a zero share of the local partner. With symmetric information about V and Cj, 
the partners wait wiih undertaking the venture untii V =  V*. At this moment, the locai 
partner gets  X = /-1 cj '  and the TNC receives V =  fJ~1 X . 
We show that the extended bilateral model does not raise the critical value of 
the profits for setting up the Jv. Under the new assumptions, the TNC will be inclined 
to  report a lower value of the investment, while the local company tends to  report a 
higher cost.  The local company will  only report the  true  cost  as  long  as  the  value 
reported  by  the  TNC  is  relatively  low.  To  be  more  precise,  Cj  is  reported  when 
investment is  not optimal, given  the  reported value  of the  project,  i.e.  V does  not 
exceed the  double  markup  over the  construction  cost  (the  markup  required  by  the 
TNC as  well as  the markup required by the local company). Setting a higher (lower) 
value  than  Cj  leads  to  a  later  (earlier)  realization  of the  cash  flows,  and  is  from 
equation (12) not optimal. When the reported V exceeds the double markup, the local 
company will set Cj  so that the company just tends to invest. So, the local company's 
optimal cost setting c conditional on the TNC's optimal report of the value it receives 
from investing, V  ,  is 
~I  ~  [(fJ-1 )2  ~  ]  C V =  Max  If""  V, C  j  •  (19) 
The TNC's optimal value setting is  V as long as  investment is not optimal, given the 
reported  cost  of construction.  When  investment  appears  to  be  optimal  given  the 
reported cost of construction, i.e.  V  ~  (/-1 r  c  ,  the TNC will report the smallest value 
such that the TNC invests, i.e. V =  (/-1 r  c. When investment is not optimal yet, the 
TNC also reports the true value. Hence, 
12 (20) 
Figure 2.1  and 2.2 show  the optimal cost and value setting of the local partner and 
TNC for  a relatively high  V and  a relatively low  V.  For high  V,  i.e.  V  ~  (!-IY c, 
immediate investment is always optimal. 
-------------------------------------- Insert figure 2.1 about here --------------------------------
In figure 2.1, we have V=12, c=2 and 13=2, leading to V*=8. The reaction functions of 
the partners overlap at  2 = tv  for  8 ~  V  :::; 12. This line yields  the Nash equilibria. 
There is no need for the TNC to report a lower value of the JV, and no need for the 
local  company to  report higher cost.  The payoff to  the TNC  (local  partner) ranges 
from 8 (2) when (V,c) =  (8,2) to 6 (4) when (V,c) =  (12,3). In a sequential monopoly, 
the  payoffs  equal  the  latter payoffs;  i.e.  for  the  TNC  the  payoff equals  the  worst 
outcome of the Nash equilibria, and for the  local partner the payoff equals the best 
outcome. 
-------------------------------------- Insert figure 2.2 about here --------------------------------
In figure 2.2, the same parameter values for c and 13  are used as in figure 2.1, but the 
value  of the project decreases  to  V=6.  In  this  case,  postponement is  optimal.  The 
reaction curves intersect at a unique Nash equilibrium: V =  6,2 =  2. In this case, the 
companies do not bargain over excess profits. Both partners recognize that reporting 
13 the true value leads to the most rapid realization of the pie consisting of the minimum 
required markup for both partners, and hence to the biggest pie. 
The solution under non-cooperation is far from efficient, as it leads to a very 
high threshold for undertaking the JV. The next sections will show how cooperation 
between both  partners lowers  the trigger value of investment. It is  shown that the 
trigger value can even be lower than the threshold required by a vertically integrated 
company. 
4 Cooperative Joint Ventures 
Let Yv denote the bargaining power of the company and Yx the bargaining power of the 
local partner.  The bargaining powers  are  normalized so that they sum up  to  unity 
(Yv+yx=I). The Nash bargaining solution is the outcome to the following maximization 
problem: 
m~x  {  (8  (1 - r)V *  +cp - X)( :. )  fi } Y"  { ( X - cp - C j  + (1 - 8)V *)( :. )  fi } Y  x  •  (21) 
D.V.X 
Setting the partial derivative with respect to X equal to zero gives 
(1 - r)8V *  +cp - X = Y  v (V *  -c  j  - r8V *  )  ,  (22) 
and also 
(23) 
The equations  reflects  that the  payoff to  the TNC is  the product of its  bargaining 
power and the total payoff. Similarly, it follows that the payoff to the local company 
also equals the product of its bargaining power and the total payoff to the investment. 
Setting the partial derivative with respect to V* equal to zero and substituting 
(22) and (23) in the resulting expression gives 
14 V* - fJ  - (fJ-1)(1-8'l") C  j  •  (24) 
Substituting (22), (23), and (24) into (21), it is found that the payoff to the cooperative 
JV is  C j  /  (f3 - 1). From (24), this payoff is realized at the earliest moment when 8 -
and hence V*- is minimized, i.e.  8=0. Hence, the partners want to invest as  soon as 
possible, and give up any additional value of waiting by demanding a higher share. 
The result of this policy is that the trigger value in (24) is lower than the trigger value 
in (4), even when the costs of setting up the JV are the same for the local partner and 
the TNC. The reason behind this result lies in the possibility of tax evasion by the 
TNC in a cooperative JV. The finding is consistent with Luo (1996) who suggests that 
the profitability4  of a wholly-owned subsidiary in China is  significantly higher than 
the profitability of a Chinese JV. 
The result crucially depends on a positive differential taxation. When 't=0, the 
derivative with respect to 8 yields the same equation as the derivative with respect to 
X, which means that there is no explicit solution for 8 and X. Any combination of the 
variables satisfying (22) and (23) is optimal. Consider '!>O. From (22), it follows that 
g  = X-Y,Cj+Y.'v* 
(l-,"-t)', )v*  . 
(25) 
The results are in line with Fagre and Wells (1982) and Lecraw (1984) who suggests a 
positive  relation  between  the  bargaining power and  the  percent equity  ownership. 
They explore the relationship between the characteristics of a multinational enterprise 
(MNE)  and  the  percent  equity  ownership  that  the  MNE  achieves  in  the  foreign 
country. It is  found  that firm-specific  advantages such as  leadership in technology, 
production, marketing, finance, and management are critical for the bargaining power 
4 more specific, the operating profit margin. Note that a higher V* corresponds with a higher 
profitability. 
15 of the MNE. The bargaining power of the foreign company depends on the country-
specific advantages of the firm's home country, such as natural resources, market size, 
income level, and factor costs. 
The  analysis  of  a  minimum  share  imposed  by  the  government  is 
straightforward. With a minimum  share,  the optimal share is  exactly the minimum 
share  imposed by  the  government.  The higher the  minimum share,  the  longer the 
partners  will  wait  with  setting up  the  JV.  Next,  we  distinguish  between two  other 
cases: (i)  X~Cj, and (ii) no restriction on 8. 
Case  1.  X2cj- Equation (25)  shows that the  share of the TNC is minimized 
when X=cj- Substituting X=Cj, and V* = (/J-l.ftl-8T) cj  in (25), and rearranging gives 
g  =  /J+y,-l 
/J-Hryv-2/Jry" 
By substituting (26) in (24), the critical value can now be written as 
V* - /J-Hry,-2/Jry, 
- (1-2ry,--r)(/J-l) cj • 
(26) 
(27) 
Case 2.  In the absence of restrictions on the shares, licensing of technology is 
optima15.  Since both parties want to  minimize the share of the MNE, they prefer a 
zero share of the MNE. Therefore, from (25), the transfer price is negative and equals 
y  v (c j  - V *). Substituting 8=0 in (27) and the resulting equation in the transfer price 
gIves 
x =  - ~~cl  •  (28) 
The transfer price, i.e. the payment by the local company to the MNE in exchange for 
the use of the technology, is  increasing in uncertainty, the bargaining power of the 
MNE and the cost of the investment. So, the larger the investment project, the higher 
5 See Horstmann and Markusen (1987) for a static model of the tradeoff between licensing and FDI. 
16 the price of the license. Note that the critical value at which investment takes place is 
equai to the trigger value of investment for a local company that owns the investment 
opportunity and has the required knowledge of technology. 
Licensing  of  technology  without  jointly  exploiting  the  project  deters 
investment  smce  the  cost  of  the  license  is  irreversible  and  accompames  the 
irreversible  cost  of installing  the  project.  Hence,  the  trigger  value  of investment 
decreases. 
5. Exporting versus FDI 
The previous  analysis  ignored the  possibility that  the TNC  can  also  export  to  the 
foreign  market.  Because  of  different  competitive  advantages,  the  costs  of  the 
contribution by the local company is different from  Cj  and cw,  say  Ceo  In the case of 
exporting,  the company does  not make  an  irreversible commitment abroad.  Hence, 
there  is  no  option  value  in  waiting,  and the  company  will  export  as  soon  as  the 
benefits of exporting are higher than the costs, i.e. V>ce. In the case of FDI, the local 
company will require an option value of waiting in addition to  the costs of FDI. The 
company  will  only  undertake  FDI  when  the  value  of  waiting  to  undertake  the 
investment  is  zero.  Besides  the  option  value  that  the  local  company  requires,  it 
follows from the previous analysis that there are circumstances in  which the foreign 
company  also  charges  a markup.  So,  another reason  for  exporting is  to  prevent a 
markup when the foreign government enforces restrictions on the joint venture which 
preclude a Pareto-optimal solution. 
Disadvantages of exporting include (i)  a competitive disadvantage about the 
required input,  and (ii)  transportation costs.  Both disadvantages  lead to  a  Ce  that is 
higher  than  Cw  and  c}  It depends  on  the  restrictions  that  the  foreign  government 
17 imposes, the competitive advantages of the foreign company, the transportation costs, 
the uncertainty about future payoffs, and the interest rate whether exporting or FDI is 
the  optimal  strategy  for  the  local  company.  Less  restrictions  from  the  foreign 
government,  more  competitive  advantages  of  the  foreign  company,  higher 
transportation costs, less uncertainty about future payoffs, and lower interest rates all 
favor FDI. 
-------------------------------------- Insert figure 3 about here --------------------------------
Figure  3  summarizes  the  differences  between  the  trigger  values  of a  non-
contractual joint venture, a wholly-owned subsidiary, a contractual joint venture, and 
exporting. The share of the MNE within the IV is unrestricted. The cost of investment 
for the IV (Cj), the was (cw), and exporting (ce)  are 1, 1.5 and 2.25, respectively. The 
threshold for exporting is independent of uncertainty, and obviously equals 2.25. The 
thresholds for a non-contractual IV and a was exceed the one of a contractual IV for 
all values of B.  Given the possibility of a contractual IV, the MNE will export when 
(i)  uncertainty is high, and (ii) V does  not exceed the trigger value of a cooperative 
IV. When uncertainty is relatively low, the MNE can benefit from a contractual IV by 
the lower cost and the profit sharing with the iocal partner. Without the possibility of a 
contractual IV, the MNE will export when (i) uncertainty is high, and (ii) V does not 
exceed the trigger value of a non-contractual IV of a was. When V rises, it first hits 
the investment threshold of a non-contractual IV when uncertainty is relatively low, 
while V first hits the trigger value of a was when uncertainty is relatively high. 
18 6. Conclusion 
Compared to the fixed timing of entry in Buckley and Casson (1981), in our model, 
the trigger value of investment is lower for licensing under Nash bargaining than for a 
JV with or without contractual share. Without cooperation, licensing is rare since the 
local company has a value in waiting to invest. Contrary to licensing under bargaining 
where the local company has  a lower bargaining power and hence pays more for the 
license, an increase in the irreversible cost of the license without bargaining results in 
a much higher investment threshold. Since exporting yields no option value of waiting 
to  invest (only the variable cost is  higher), it depends on the variable cost which of 
both is preferred. This result is consistent with the analysis of Buckley and Casson. 
When profits of the JV are differentially taxed for the local company and the 
TNC  with  a  higher tax  for  the  TNC,  it is  shown  that  the  lowest  trigger  value  of 
investment is reached when the local company can invest without the TNC or when 
the local company can license the technology of the TNC. Generally, a local company 
does  not possess the knowledge to  undertake the investment opportunity. Licensing 
requires a large commitment by the local firm. A JV has the next lowest critical value 
of investment. As a result of differential taxation, it is shown that the trigger value of 
investment is  lower when the TNC cooperates with the local partner within the  JV 
than when it undertakes the investment as a wholly-owned subsidiary. 
There is a worst case when there is no cooperation and a zero share of the local 
company in which the JV will only be set up when the profits exceed the quadratic 
relative  markup  that  is  optimal  for  a  vertically  integrated  company.  In  this  case 
namely, the TNC waits until the project value exceeds the transfer price charged by 
the local company by a certain markup, while the local company adds the same mark-
up to the cost of investment in order to fix the transfer price. 
19 Kogut (1989) found that a joint venture is often followed by a sale of the local 
partner's share to  the  MNE.  In  our analysis,  we  neglected the  sequential  option to 
acquire  the  local  company  that  accompanies  the  equity  JV.  Under  a  licensing 
agreement, the MNE foregoes the option to acquire. Therefore, the MNE may want to 
wait  until  the  project  value  reaches  the  trigger value  of an  equity JV,  and  ignore 
licensing.  When  the  project  value  increases,  the  trigger  value  of a  wholly-owned 
subsidiary may be reached and the MNE will decide to  buy the share of the foreign 
partner. Hence, when the sequential option to acquire the local company is included, 
the optimal policy will not be to have a zero share, but to have a small positive share. 
This sheds other light on the conjecture of Svesjnar and Smith (1984) that a JV will 
refrain from a zero share because a low equity share would alert the host government 
to the problem of tax avoidance. 
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Figure 1: Optimal profit share of the TNC for different values of ~ and't (dotted line: 
't=O.l; dashed line: 't=O.3; solid line: 't=O.5). 
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Figure 2.1: Reaction functions for the TNC and the local company. Parameter values: 
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Figure 2.2: Reaction functions for the TNC and the local company. Parameter values: 
V=6, c=2,  ~=2, V*=8. Unique Nash equilibrium: V  = 6;c = 2. 
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Figure 3: Trigger values for a non-cooperative joint venture (NCJV), a wholly-owned 
subsidiary (WQS), a cooperative joint venture (CJV), and exporting (EXP). 
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